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DO MULTINATIONALS REALLY PREFER TO ENTER CULTURALLY-DISTANT 
COUNTRIES THROUGH GREENFIELDS RATHER THAN THROUGH ACQUISITIONS? THE 
ROLE OF PARENT EXPERIENCE AND SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY 
 
Abstract 
Prior research has argued that multinational enterprises (MNEs) prefer to enter culturally-distant countries 
through greenfields rather than through acquisitions, since acquisitions in such countries are costlier to 
manage. This argument contains two hidden assumptions: (1) the additional costs of acquisitions in 
culturally-distant countries are the same for all MNEs, and (2) such acquisitions have no benefits over 
their greenfield counterparts. In this paper we relax these two assumptions by arguing that an MNE’s 
preference for greenfields in culturally-distant countries depends on its international and host-country 
experience, and on the level of autonomy it plans to grant the focal subsidiary. Analyzing 171 wholly-
owned greenfield investments and full acquisitions made by Dutch MNEs in 35 countries, we find that 
these MNEs prefer to enter culturally-distant countries through greenfields, but that this preference is 
lower when they have little international experience, or plan to grant the focal subsidiary considerable 
autonomy in marketing. 
 
Keywords: greenfield; acquisition; cultural distance; international experience; host-country experience; 
subsidiary autonomy 
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Introduction 
The sharp rise in foreign investment during the last decades of the 20th century has increasingly exposed 
firms to other cultures (UNCTAD, 2000; Hofstede, 2001). This has led scholars (Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Larimo, 2003) to examine how the cultural distance to the target country of 
an investment affects the choice by multinational enterprises (MNEs) between entering that country 
through a greenfield investment (i.e., a new subsidiary established from scratch) or an acquisition, the so-
called establishment mode choice (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). These scholars have argued that the 
costs of managing acquisitions increase faster with cultural distance than those of managing greenfields, 
leading them to hypothesize that MNEs will prefer to enter culturally-distant countries through 
greenfields rather than through acquisitions. Several studies have found empirical support for this 
hypothesis (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003). 
Yet, MNEs do not always enter culturally-distant countries through greenfields. In fact, they 
frequently enter them through acquisitions. For example, in Barkema and Vermeulen’s (1998) sample, 
42% of the investments by Dutch MNEs in the culturally-distant continents of Central and South 
America, Asia, and Africa were acquisitions. This indicates that under particular conditions MNEs prefer 
to enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions rather than through greenfields. In this paper we 
aim to identify these conditions by relaxing two implicit assumptions made in prior studies on the impact 
of cultural distance on establishment mode choice. The first implicit assumption made in these studies is 
that the additional costs of managing acquisitions in culturally-distant countries over the costs of 
managing greenfields are the same for all MNEs. We contend that these additional costs are likely to be 
lower for MNEs with extensive international or host-country experience because such MNEs have better 
cross-cultural management skills (Barkema et al., 1996). We therefore hypothesize that these experienced 
MNEs are more likely to make acquisitions in culturally-distant countries than their inexperienced 
counterparts. The additional management costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are also 
likely to be lower for MNEs that grant their subsidiaries considerable autonomy, since such MNEs 
interact less intensely with their subsidiaries and should hence experience fewer culture-related conflicts 
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with them (Shenkar, 2001). We therefore hypothesize that MNEs planning to grant the focal subsidiary 
much autonomy also have a higher propensity to enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions. 
The second assumption made in prior establishment mode studies is that acquisitions in culturally-
distant countries only have disadvantages over their greenfield counterparts in the form of higher 
management costs. We contend, however, that such acquisitions also have important advantages because 
they bring novel practices and knowledge of a culturally-distant market, while wholly-owned greenfields 
do not (Wilson, 1980; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Since MNEs with little international or host-
country experience typically lack these assets, this pleads for the contrary hypothesis that these 
inexperienced MNEs, rather than their experienced counterparts, have a higher propensity to enter 
culturally-distant countries through acquisitions. In addition, we argue that the novel practices and local 
market knowledge that come with acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are also more valuable to 
MNEs that grant their subsidiaries more autonomy. This argument reinforces our earlier hypothesis that 
MNEs planning to grant the focal subsidiary considerable autonomy have a higher propensity to enter 
culturally-distant countries through acquisitions. Analyzing a sample of 171 wholly-owned greenfield 
investments and full acquisitions made by Dutch MNEs in 35 countries, we find that these MNEs prefer 
to enter culturally-distant countries through greenfields, but that their preference for acquisitions in such 
countries is significantly higher when they have little international experience, or plan to grant the focal 
subsidiary considerable autonomy in marketing. 
Our paper contributes to previous research by identifying several important factors that weaken the 
positive relationship between cultural distance and the likelihood that MNEs choose greenfield entry, 
thereby improving our understanding of how national cultural differences influence MNEs’ establishment 
mode choices. Specifically, whereas prior establishment mode studies have implicitly assumed that the 
additional management costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are the same for all MNEs, we 
contend that these additional costs are firm-specific. Moreover, whereas prior studies have focused on the 
additional costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries, we also take into account the benefits of 
such acquisitions over wholly-owned greenfields, and show that these benefits are firm-specific as well. 
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An empirical contribution of our study is that we use a mix of survey and archival data, whereas prior 
establishment mode studies have typically relied exclusively on archival data. This mix allows us to 
employ variables closely reflecting our theoretical constructs, and to carefully control for other factors 
affecting MNEs’ establishment mode choices. 
 
Literature review 
There is considerable research on the determinants of the choice by MNEs between expanding abroad 
through greenfields or acquisitions (for reviews, see Datta et al., 2002 and Shimizu et al., 2004). One 
important determinant is the cultural distance between the home country of an MNE and the country 
entered by that MNE, since this distance differentially affects the management costs of greenfield and 
acquired subsidiaries. Acquired subsidiaries, on one hand, come with firmly-established local 
organizational and managerial practices, and with a predominantly local workforce. The larger the 
cultural distance to the target country, the more incompatible the practices and values of employees of 
acquired subsidiaries will be with those of their MNE acquirers (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995), causing 
the management costs of acquired subsidiaries to increase substantially with cultural distance. Greenfield 
subsidiaries, on the other hand, are established from scratch and hence do not come with established 
workers and practices (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002). Instead, MNEs can staff their greenfield 
subsidiaries with personnel that fits their culture reasonably well, and can introduce their practices in such 
subsidiaries without having to abolish divergent established practices first (Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Hennart and Park, 1993). Consequently, the costs of managing greenfields will increase only marginally 
with cultural distance (Hofstede, 2001; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Because the costs of managing 
greenfields increase less rapidly with cultural distance than those of managing acquisitions, prior 
establishment mode research has hypothesized that an MNE’s preference for greenfields over acquisitions 
increases with the cultural distance to the target country (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995; Larimo, 2003). Several studies have found empirical support for this claim (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003). 
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However, while MNEs may prefer in some cases to enter culturally-distant countries through 
greenfields, they do not always do so. As stated earlier, in Barkema and Vermeulen’s (1998) sample, 42% 
of the investments by Dutch MNEs in the culturally-distant continents of Central and South America, 
Asia, and Africa were acquisitions (vs. 79% of the investments in the culturally-closer continents of 
Europe, North America, and Australia).1 In fact, the number of acquisitions in culturally-dissimilar 
countries is growing (Morosini et al., 1998), partly because many countries relaxed their foreign 
acquisition restrictions in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2000). These observations suggest that under certain 
conditions MNEs find it more attractive to enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions rather 
than through greenfields. Below we identify these conditions by relaxing two hidden assumptions made 
by previous studies. 
 
Relaxing assumption 1: The additional costs of managing acquisitions are the same for all MNEs 
Prior studies of the relationship between cultural distance and establishment mode choice have argued 
that MNEs prefer to enter culturally-distant countries through greenfields rather than through acquisitions, 
since acquisitions in such countries are costlier to manage (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Larimo, 2003). Hence, these studies have implicitly assumed that the additional 
costs of managing acquisitions in culturally-distant countries over the costs of managing greenfields are 
the same for all MNEs. However, these additional costs are likely to vary with an MNE’s international 
and host-country experience. An MNE’s international experience refers to its experience with managing 
operations outside its home country, without reference to specific host countries, while its host-country 
experience refers to its experience with the target country of the focal investment. Both these experiences 
may reduce the additional management costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries, because they 
act as mechanisms that lower cultural challenges (Shenkar, 2001). According to organizational learning 
scholars (Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), MNEs with extensive international 
experience have been exposed to a large variety of foreign cultures, and will hence experience fewer 
cultural difficulties in a given host country than MNEs with little international experience. 
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Internationally-experienced MNEs will therefore incur fewer additional costs in managing acquired 
subsidiaries located in culturally-distant countries. Similarly, MNEs with extensive host-country 
experience generally know better how local firms are organized and how they operate, and know more 
about the culture and communication style of local workers than MNEs without such experience. MNEs 
with prior experience with a host country will therefore incur fewer additional costs in managing acquired 
subsidiaries in that country than MNEs without host-country experience. Consequently, MNEs with 
extensive international or host-country experience should be less hesitant to make acquisitions in 
culturally-distant countries than their inexperienced counterparts. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher an MNE’s international experience, the higher the likelihood that it will 
enter a culturally-distant country through an acquisition rather than through a greenfield investment. 
Hypothesis 2a: The higher an MNE’s host-country experience, the higher the likelihood that it will 
enter a culturally-distant country through an acquisition rather than through a greenfield investment. 
 
Besides varying with an MNE’s experience, the additional costs of managing acquisitions in 
culturally-distant countries may also vary with the level of autonomy an MNE grants the focal subsidiary. 
This level of autonomy primarily depends on whether the MNE parent finds it more important to realize 
economies of scale or to be locally responsive. MNE parents attempting to realize subsidiary or corporate-
level economies of scale based on R&D or reputation will grant the focal subsidiary little autonomy, 
because the realization of such economies requires that the subsidiary performs specific activities as 
desired by the parent. MNE parents aiming to be locally responsive, on the other hand, will grant the 
subsidiary considerable autonomy, because local responsiveness requires adaptation of a subsidiary’s 
products or business activities to local conditions (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Anand and Delios, 1996). 
When MNE parents grant specific subsidiaries little autonomy, they will interact intensely with 
these subsidiaries. In such cases the management costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are 
likely to be much higher than those of their greenfield counterparts, since acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries come with divergent practices and a culturally-different workforce, whereas wholly-owned 
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greenfields do not. Consequently, the amount of cultural friction between MNE parents and their non-
autonomous subsidiaries located in culturally-distant countries will be much higher when these 
subsidiaries are acquired ones than when they are greenfield ones. On the other hand, when MNE parents 
grant specific subsidiaries considerable autonomy, they will interact less intensely with these subsidiaries. 
In such cases the management costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries need not exceed those 
of their greenfield counterparts, as the culturally-different workforce and practices that come with 
acquisitions will not cause cultural friction when there is little parent-subsidiary interaction (Shenkar, 
2001). Consequently, the likelihood that MNEs will enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions 
should increase with the level of autonomy they plan to grant the focal subsidiary. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of autonomy that an MNE plans to grant the focal subsidiary, the 
higher the likelihood that it will enter a culturally-distant country through an acquisition rather than 
through a greenfield investment. 
 
Relaxing assumption 2: Acquisitions have no culture-related benefits over greenfields 
As stated earlier, prior establishment mode studies have argued that acquisitions come with established 
local practices while greenfields do not, causing the costs of managing acquisitions to increase faster with 
cultural distance than those of managing greenfields. Hence, these studies have implicitly assumed that 
acquisitions have no culture-related benefits over greenfields. However, the fact that acquired firms bring 
their own practices may actually be an advantage rather than a disadvantage (Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001; Anand and Delios, 2002; Shimizu et al., 2004). The reason is that some of these practices are non-
location bound and can hence be exploited by their MNE acquirers in other countries (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 1992). Because their nature depends on the acquired firm’s history and environment (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Kostova, 1999), they are likely to be especially novel when the acquired firm is 
located in a culturally-distant country (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Morosini et al., 1998). Hence, the larger 
the cultural distance to a country, the more MNEs will benefit from the practices that come with an 
acquisition in that country. Because an MNE’s existing practices are typically inert and hence difficult to 
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change (Nelson and Winter, 1982), acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are an excellent vehicle for 
MNEs to efficiently obtain radically-new practices (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Thus, while prior 
establishment mode research has considered culturally-determined differences in practices between 
MNEs and local firms to be a barrier to cross-border acquisitions, such differences may in fact encourage 
MNEs to make these acquisitions (Very et al., 1997; Child et al., 2001).  
A second advantage of acquisitions over wholly-owned greenfields is that they bring local market 
knowledge (Wilson, 1980) and hence enable MNEs to be locally responsive (Harzing, 2002). Such 
knowledge is typically location-bound, i.e. only applicable in a particular country or a small set of 
culturally-similar countries (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Since market knowledge is to a large extent 
tacit and experiential, it is difficult to purchase in disembodied form (Hennart, 1982) and time consuming 
to develop through greenfield investments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). It is therefore more efficiently 
obtained through acquisitions (Harzing, 2002). Local market knowledge is particularly important to 
MNEs expanding into culturally-distant countries (Tan and Mahoney, 2003), because such countries have 
radically-different values, customs, business practices, and customer preferences with which MNEs are 
likely to be unfamiliar or uncomfortable (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Caves, 1996; Hofstede, 2001). Hence, 
the larger the cultural distance to a country, the more MNEs will benefit from the market knowledge that 
comes with an acquisition in that country. 
Thus, acquisitions in culturally-distant countries have the advantage over wholly-owned greenfields 
of bringing radically-different new practices and knowledge of a culturally-dissimilar market. Such 
practices and knowledge are especially valuable to MNEs without host-country experience, since such 
MNEs are likely to lack these assets and may hence improve their global or local competitive position by 
obtaining them through acquisitions. MNEs with extensive host-country experience, on the other hand, 
are more likely to be familiar with local practices and the local market, and may hence find the benefits of 
making an acquisition in that market to be limited. A similar line of reasoning applies to an MNE’s 
international experience. MNEs with little such experience are likely to have a small pool of practices and 
market knowledge, and may hence benefit considerably from enlarging this pool with radically-different 
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practices and market knowledge by entering culturally-distant countries through acquisitions. 
Internationally-experienced MNEs, on the other hand, already have a large pool of diverse practices and 
knowledge of many different markets (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), and will thus value less the 
practices and market knowledge that come with acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. Hence, while 
hypotheses 1a and 2a proposed that experienced MNEs are more likely to enter culturally-distant 
countries through acquisitions, the above suggests the reverse view that inexperienced MNEs are more 
likely to do so. That is: 
Hypothesis 1b: The lower an MNE’s international experience, the higher the likelihood that it will 
enter a culturally-distant country through an acquisition rather than through a greenfield investment. 
Hypothesis 2b: The lower an MNE’s host-country experience, the higher the likelihood that it will 
enter a culturally-distant country through an acquisition rather than through a greenfield investment. 
 
In sum, international and host-country experience do not only reduce the additional management 
costs of acquisitions in culturally-distant countries (as reflected in hypotheses 1a and 2a), but also the 
benefits of such acquisitions over greenfields (as reflected in hypotheses 1b and 2b). As a result, it is a 
priori unclear how these two experience types will moderate the relationship between cultural distance 
and establishment mode choice. 
The moderating effect of the level of subsidiary autonomy, on the other hand, is theoretically less 
ambiguous. We have argued earlier that MNEs granting their subsidiaries more autonomy will find the 
additional costs of managing acquisitions in culturally-distant countries to be lower. We contend that 
these MNEs will at the same consider the benefits of such acquisitions over greenfields to be larger for 
two reasons. First, parent-firm managers who grant subsidiaries considerable autonomy tend to have a 
polycentric mindset (Harzing, 2000), meaning that they value local practices (Perlmutter, 1969). Since the 
novelty of such practices increases with cultural distance (Morosini et al., 1998), these managers will find 
acquisitions in culturally-distant countries to be particularly valuable. Parent-firm managers who grant 
subsidiaries little autonomy, on the other hand, are more likely to have an ethnocentric mindset, and will 
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hence be less receptive to foreign practices (Perlmutter, 1969; Harzing, 2000). These managers will 
consider the home-grown practices of their parent firm to be superior and will be skeptic of local 
practices. The larger the cultural distance to a country, the more skeptical they will be about the practices 
of local firms, and the less merit they will see in acquiring these firms. 
Second, MNEs granting their subsidiaries considerable autonomy, such as those following a 
multidomestic strategy (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Anand and Delios, 1996), typically aim to be locally 
responsive rather than globally integrated, and hence need to have intimate knowledge of the local 
market, especially in culturally-distant countries with radically-different values, customs, business 
practices, and customer preferences (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001). Because acquisitions in 
culturally-distant countries bring this knowledge whereas their wholly-owned greenfield counterparts do 
not, MNEs granting their subsidiaries considerable autonomy should find such acquisitions very valuable. 
On the other hand, MNEs granting their subsidiaries little autonomy, such as those following a global 
strategy, do not aim to be locally responsive and will hence value acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries and their market knowledge less. Instead, they will find it more attractive to enter such countries 
through greenfields, so as to reap the benefits of their global strategy (Harzing, 2002). 
In sum, acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are not only less costly but also more beneficial 
to MNEs granting their subsidiaries much autonomy than to MNEs granting them little autonomy. MNEs 
planning to grant the focal subsidiary much autonomy should therefore have a higher propensity to enter 
culturally-distant countries through acquisitions, as already expressed earlier in hypothesis 3. 
 
Methodology 
Data collection 
We collected our data in mid-2003 from several secondary sources (to be specified below) and through a 
mail survey of top managers of Dutch MNEs with more than 100 employees. We had identified the names 
of these managers and their firms through the REview and Analysis of Companies in Holland (REACH) 
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database, which contains Chamber of Commerce data on all firms registered in the Netherlands.2 Dutch 
subsidiaries of foreign MNE parents were excluded from the survey. 
The carefully-designed questionnaire was first evaluated by several international management 
scholars, and subsequently pre-tested on five senior managers whose firms had recently established or 
acquired foreign subsidiaries. These pre-tests resulted in several changes in the wording of questions. In 
the questionnaire we asked managers to provide data on one of their firm’s foreign greenfield investments 
or acquisitions, or on one of each. To ensure the reliability of this data, we structured the questionnaire in 
such a way that respondents would only provide investment data if (1) their firm was responsible for 
foreign establishment mode decisions, (2) the investments had been completed in 1995 or a later year, and 
(3) the respondents had been personally involved in them. 
We sent the questionnaire to 1,782 managers of 821 Dutch firms.3 Eighty-nine managers turned out 
to be no longer employed at the firms contacted, while another 19 worked for firms without foreign 
subsidiaries. Three hundred and twenty-two questionnaires were filled out and returned – a response rate 
of 19.2%, comparable to that of other foreign entry mode studies using survey data (e.g., Kim and 
Hwang, 1992: 22%; Harzing, 2002: 20%). Respondents were mostly CEOs and CFOs, although in some 
cases they had other titles, such as Member of the Management Team and Director of Corporate 
Development. Two hundred of the 322 respondents indicated that their firm was responsible for foreign 
establishment mode decisions in which they had been personally involved in recent years, and thus 
provided data on one of their firm’s foreign greenfields or acquisitions, or on one of each.4 In total we 
received data on 248 foreign investments made by 159 MNEs. We excluded 77 investments from our 
analyses; nine because of incomplete data, and 68 for reasons to be specified below. The final sample 
consists of 171 investments – 92 wholly-owned greenfields and 79 full acquisitions – completed by 120 
MNEs in 35 countries between 1995 and 2003. Table 1 shows the geographic distribution of the 
investments, while Table 2 shows the industry distribution of the MNEs that made them. 
< Insert Table 1 and 2 about here > 
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Non-response bias 
To assess whether the 120 MNEs whose investments comprise the final sample are representative of the 
full population of Dutch MNEs, we examined whether they differed from the 701 MNEs whose managers 
either did not respond to our questionnaire or did respond but provided no or unusable investment data. T-
tests that corrected for unequal variances across groups indicated that the 120 MNEs included in the final 
sample are significantly larger than these 701 MNEs, both in annual worldwide sales and in number of 
employees (P<0.05 for both variables, two-tailed), with the former having on average sales of 3.38 billion 
euros and approximately 12,200 employees, and the latter sales of 1.30 billion and approximately 3500 
employees.5 Hence, our findings may not be generalizable to relatively small MNEs.6 
 
Dependent and key independent variables 
Establishment mode. The dependent variable is the establishment mode chosen by an MNE for a specific 
foreign investment, i.e. whether the investment was a greenfield or an acquisition. We obtained this 
information from the questionnaire and created a dummy variable coded 1 for greenfields and 0 for 
acquisitions. Since local partners in greenfield joint ventures (JVs) bring in new practices and local 
market knowledge (Hennart, 1988), such ventures provide benefits which resemble those of acquisitions. 
Hence, our claim that acquisitions have benefits over greenfields only applies to wholly-owned 
greenfields. To perform a cleaner test of our hypotheses, we therefore excluded from our sample all 68 
investments involving a local co-owner. Following Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), we thus focus on the 
choice between wholly-owned greenfields and full acquisitions. 
Cultural distance. To maximize comparability with prior establishment mode studies, we measure 
the cultural distance between the Netherlands and our 35 host countries through the Kogut and Singh 
(1988) index (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Larimo, 2003). This index is 
based on the differences in scores on each of Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of national culture, viz. 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. The validity of these dimensions 
has been empirically confirmed in many studies (e.g., Van Oudenhoven, 2001; for a review of earlier 
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replications, see Sφndergaard, 1994), indicating that they can reliably be used to classify countries 
according to their national cultures and to determine the cultural distance between them. 
MNE’s international experience. Following Caves and Mehra (1986), Kogut and Singh (1988), and 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), we measure an MNE’s international experience through the log of the 
number of foreign countries in which the MNE has subsidiaries. We obtained this number from the 
responding MNEs’ annual reports and corporate websites. Following Vermeulen and Barkema (2001), we 
also distinguish between an MNE’s international experience with greenfields and its international 
experience with acquisitions, so as to examine whether these two types of international experience 
moderate the relationship between cultural distance and establishment mode choice in the same way. 
Since respondents are unlikely to know how many of their firms’ foreign subsidiaries all over the world 
are greenfield ones and how many acquired ones, we asked respondents to indicate on two 7-point Likert-
type scales how much experience their firm had with foreign greenfields and with foreign acquisitions 
(see Appendix A for the exact wording of the items). 
MNE’s host-country experience. As shown in Appendix A, we obtained data on an MNE’s host-
country experience by asking survey respondents to indicate whether their firm had previously been 
active in the country entered through (1) licensing agreements, (2) sales agents, (3) sales subsidiaries, (4) 
manufacturing or service subsidiaries, or (5) other means. As these experiences increase an MNE’s 
knowledge of the host country to a different extent (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), we assigned different 
values to them. Specifically, the first four experience types were given the values of 1 through 4, 
respectively. Almost all experiences in the fifth category involved direct exports to the host country and 
were assigned a value of 2. Our measure of an MNE’s host-country experience is the sum of the values 
assigned to the different experience types.7 
Subsidiary autonomy. Since the level of autonomy granted to a specific subsidiary is hard to 
measure from secondary sources, we followed Datta (1991) and Weber et al. (1996), among others, and 
assessed this level of autonomy through the questionnaire. We asked respondents to indicate how much 
autonomy their management team planned to give the subsidiary at the time it was established or 
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acquired. As shown in Appendix A, we asked them to do so for 12 different business activities on 5-point 
Likert-type scales. We deliberately asked for the planned rather than for the realized level of autonomy 
for each activity because the planned level better reflects parents’ strategic intentions. The reason is that 
high realized levels of autonomy may reflect either deliberate choices by parents to grant much autonomy 
or unsuccessful attempts by parents to obtain tight control over subsidiary activities. 
We created a summated autonomy scale by combining the individual autonomy items into a single 
composite measure. Such a scale is reliable if the inter-item correlations exceed 0.30 and the item-to-scale 
correlations 0.50 (Hair et al., 1998). We therefore excluded the item ‘raising capital’, as it had a low 
correlation with most of the other items and an item-to-scale correlation of only 0.31.8 The 11 remaining 
items generally satisfied Hair et al.’s (1998) correlation criteria and formed a highly reliable scale with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88. We therefore averaged their scores into a composite measure of the planned 
level of subsidiary autonomy.9 
 
Control variables 
We control for the most important other factors that have been found to affect establishment mode 
choices by MNEs, viz.: 
MNE’s level of diversification. Widely-diversified MNEs may prefer acquisitions over greenfields 
because their main advantage consists in advanced management control systems that reduce the 
incremental costs of making and managing acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993). Following prior studies 
(Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003), we measured an MNE’s level of diversification through the log of the 
number of 4-digit BIK codes in which it operated according to the REACH database.10 
MNE type. Like those of Kogut and Singh (1988), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and Vermeulen 
and Barkema (2001), our sample consists of investments by both manufacturing and service MNEs. We 
therefore controlled for potential differences in the establishment mode choices of these two types of 
MNEs through a dummy variable coded 1 for non-manufacturing MNEs – i.e., service and wholesale 
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trade firms – and 0 for manufacturing ones. We based our classification on REACH’s description of the 
MNE parent’s main activities. 
Amount of technological knowledge to be transferred. MNEs that plan to transfer large amounts of 
firm-specific technological knowledge to their foreign subsidiaries often have a clear preference for 
greenfields, as such knowledge is easier to transfer to greenfield than to acquired subsidiaries (Hennart 
and Park, 1993). We therefore asked respondents to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale how much 
proprietary technological knowledge their firm intended to transfer to the subsidiary at the time it was 
established or acquired (see Appendix A). 
Relatedness of the investment. MNEs expanding into new industries may prefer to make 
acquisitions, as this allows them to obtain the tacit product-specific knowledge they need to successfully 
operate in the new industry (Hennart and Park, 1993; Caves, 1996). We asked respondents for a 
description of the subsidiary’s main products/services and compared it to REACH’s description of the 
parent’s main and secondary activities. In line with Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), we measured the 
relatedness of an investment by a categorical variable equal to 0 if the subsidiary’s main products/services 
were the same as the parent’s main products/services, 1 if the subsidiary’s main products/services were 
the same as the parent’s secondary products/services, and 2 if the subsidiary’s main products/services 
were different from both the parent’s main and secondary products/services.   
Investment size. Large investments are more likely to be acquisitions rather than greenfields (Caves 
and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). The likely reason is that acquired subsidiaries come with their 
own cadre of managers, which is beneficial if the minimum efficient scale of the investment is large, as a 
greenfield investment of that scale would require many managerial resources from the MNE (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986). We obtained data on the size of the investment from the questionnaire by asking 
respondents to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale the planned size of the subsidiary compared to that 
of its parent (in terms of the number of employees) (see Appendix A). 
Demand growth. In contrast to acquisitions, greenfields increase local supply and may hence 
provoke a competitive response from incumbents (Hennart and Park, 1993). Such a response is more 
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likely if an industry is growing slowly, as greenfield entry into such an industry will reduce the market 
share and profits of incumbents. MNEs entering slow-growth industries may therefore prefer acquisition 
entry. If an industry is growing more rapidly, on the other hand, greenfield entry becomes more tolerable 
for incumbents and hence more likely (Zejan, 1990). However, greenfields take time to become 
operational, which may result in high foregone profits if an industry is growing very rapidly (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986). Hence, MNEs are likely to prefer acquisitions to greenfields if an industry is either 
growing very slowly or very rapidly (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). To control for 
this curvilinear effect, we asked respondents to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale how large they thought 
the growth rate of demand for the subsidiary’s products/services would be (see Appendix A). Following 
Caves and Mehra (1986) and Hennart and Park (1993), we included in our models the absolute value of 
the deviation of this growth rate from its sample mean, expressed in standard deviation units. 
Acquisition restrictions. While many countries relaxed their foreign acquisition restrictions in the 
1990s (UNCTAD, 2000), these restrictions have not been completely abolished and may hence still affect 
an MNE’s establishment mode choice (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). 
Following Henisz (2000) and Delios and Henisz (2000), among others, we therefore control for their 
existence through the average response of thousands of senior executives surveyed for IMD’s World 
Competitiveness Yearbook to the statement “Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic 
companies”. We obtained these average responses for each of our host countries from IMD World 
Competitiveness Online, where they are reported on a yearly basis on a 0 to 10 scale. We subtracted the 
reported scores from 10, so that higher values indicate higher acquisition restrictions. By including this 
variable, we rule out the possibility that the effect of cultural distance on establishment mode choice is 
driven by formal and informal acquisition restrictions correlated with cultural distance rather than by 
firms’ strategic considerations (Henisz, 2000). 
Lack of acquisition targets. The availability of suitable acquisition targets also affects an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice (e.g., Zejan, 1990). If such targets are lacking, MNEs have to resort to 
greenfield investments. We therefore asked respondents to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale the extent to 
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which their firm was confronted with a lack of suitable local acquisition candidates at the time the 
subsidiary was established or acquired (see Appendix A). 
Year fixed-effects. Finally, since the investments in our sample were completed between 1995 and 
2003, we included year dummies in our models, using 1995 as the baseline year, so as to control for 
annual variations in the propensity to acquire (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). 
 
Common-method bias 
Because we obtained a substantial part of our data through a survey, our results are potentially affected by 
common-method bias. However, there are several reasons why such bias is unlikely to be present in this 
study. First, the data for several independent variables (i.e., cultural distance, an MNE’s international 
experience, its level of diversification, its type, and acquisition restrictions) come from secondary sources. 
Second, although an MNE’s host-country experience, its international experience with greenfields, and its 
international experience with acquisitions were obtained from the questionnaire, these experiences are 
interacted with cultural distance. Interaction effects are unlikely to be subject to common-method bias, as 
respondents are unlikely to consciously theorize moderated relationships when they fill out a survey 
(Kotabe et al., 2003). Third, we did not reveal to respondents the exact goal of the survey, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that respondents link specific variables to establishment mode choice. Finally, a 
principal-components factor analysis of all survey-based variables included in our regression models 
resulted in four factors, with the largest factor accounting for only 19% of the total explained variance of 
59.9%, suggesting the absence of common method bias (Harman, 1967). 
 
Statistical Method 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we used logistic regression to test our hypotheses. 
Logistic regression models are formally expressed as P(yi = 1) = 1 / (1 + exp(–a – Xiβ)), where yi is the 
dependent variable, Xi is the vector of independent variables for the ith observation, a is the intercept 
parameter and β is the vector of regression coefficients (Amemiya, 1981). Since the dependent variable 
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has a value of 1 if an investment was a greenfield, a positive regression coefficient indicates that a 
particular independent variable increases the probability of greenfield entry. We estimated our models 
with STATA 9.1, using the “cluster” sub-command to obtain robust (i.e., Huber-White) standard errors 
that are adjusted for the fact that several MNEs had multiple investments in our sample (see Xu et al., 
2004, for further details of this procedure). 
 
Results 
Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations. All correlations between 
pairs of independent variables included in the same model are lower than 0.3, except for that between 
cultural distance and acquisition restrictions (r=0.48). This illustrates the importance of controlling for 
these restrictions in order to isolate the impact of cultural distance. In those regression models where the 
majority of the variance of both cultural distance and acquisition restrictions was associated with the same 
condition index, the value of that index did not exceed 10, indicating that multicollinearity between 
cultural distance and acquisition restrictions is not a concern (Belsley et al., 1980: 105). The values of the 
variance inflation factors of cultural distance and acquisition restrictions confirmed this, as these values 
were only about 1.5, much lower than the multicollinearity threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
< Insert Table 3 and 4 about here > 
Table 4 displays the results of the regression analyses we performed. Since all interaction terms 
contain cultural distance and are hence highly correlated, we enter each interaction term in a separate 
model. The explanatory power of all models is good, as their Chi-squared values are all significant 
(P=0.000) and their percentages of correctly-classified observations all exceed the chance rate of 50.3% 
by more than 25% points.11 Model 1 shows that cultural distance has a positive impact on the likelihood 
of greenfield entry (P<0.01), a finding in line with that of Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), Harzing 
(2002), and Larimo (2003). Hypothesis 1a predicted that this positive impact of cultural distance would 
be weaker for MNEs with extensive international experience, while hypothesis 1b claimed that it would 
be weaker for MNEs with little such experience. Model 2b in Table 4 tests these conflicting predictions. 
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The regression coefficient of the interaction effect of cultural distance and international experience is 
significantly positive (P<0.001), indicating that internationally-experienced MNEs have a stronger 
preference for greenfields in culturally-distant countries. In other words, MNEs with little international 
experience are more likely to make acquisitions in culturally-distant countries than their experienced 
counterparts. We thus find support for hypothesis 1b. Model 2a shows that international experience also 
has a direct effect on establishment mode choice. Keeping cultural distance and all other factors constant, 
MNEs are more likely to choose acquisitions when they have more international experience (P<0.05). In 
sum, the lower an MNE’s international experience, the lower the likelihood that it will choose 
acquisitions (keeping cultural distance constant), but the higher the likelihood that it will choose 
acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. 
Models 3b and 4b test whether an MNE’s international experience with greenfields and its 
international experience with acquisitions have similar moderating effects. This is indeed the case, as the 
interaction effects of cultural distance and the two international experience types are both significantly 
positive (P<0.01 and P<0.05, respectively). Hence, both MNEs with little international greenfield 
experience and MNEs with little international acquisition experience are more likely to make acquisitions 
in culturally-distant countries than their experienced counterparts. Models 3a and 4a show that both 
experience types also have a direct effect on establishment mode choice, with MNE’s being more likely 
to choose greenfields when they have extensive greenfield experience (P<0.05) and acquisitions when 
they have extensive acquisition experience (P<0.001). Thus, the lower an MNE’s acquisition experience, 
the lower the likelihood that it will choose acquisitions (keeping cultural distance constant), but the higher 
the likelihood that it will choose acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. 
Model 5b tests hypotheses 2a and 2b. Hypothesis 2a proposed that MNEs with extensive host-
country experience would have a stronger preference for acquisitions in culturally-distant countries, while 
hypothesis 2b proposed the reverse view that MNEs with little host-country experience would have this 
stronger preference. The results of Model 5b support neither hypothesis, as the interaction effect of 
cultural distance and host-country experience is non-significant. That is, MNEs with extensive host-
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country experience are as likely to enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions as MNEs with 
little host-country experience. Model 5a shows that host-country experience does have a direct effect on 
establishment mode choice; keeping cultural distance constant, MNEs with extensive host-country 
experience are more likely to choose acquisitions rather than greenfields (P<0.01). 
Hypothesis 3, finally, claimed that MNEs planning to grant the focal subsidiary considerable 
autonomy would have a stronger preference for acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. We find no 
support for this hypothesis, as the interaction effect of cultural distance and subsidiary autonomy is non-
significant in Model 6b. Model 6a shows that subsidiary autonomy does have a direct effect on 
establishment mode choice; keeping cultural distance constant, MNEs are more inclined to choose 
acquisitions when they plan to grant the focal subsidiary much autonomy (P<0.05). 
The effects of the control variables are generally as expected and similar across all models. Product-
diversified MNEs are more likely to acquire, while those intending to transfer large amounts of 
technological knowledge are more likely to choose greenfields. Large subsidiaries are more likely to have 
been acquisitions, and both low and high-growth industries are more likely to be entered through 
acquisition. Acquisition restrictions and a lack of suitable local acquisition targets lead MNEs to choose 
greenfields. 
Because the Kogut and Singh (1988) index has limitations (Shenkar, 2001), we replicated the above 
tests using two alternative cultural distance measures, viz. (1) a Euclidean distance version of the Kogut 
and Singh (1988) index, as used in Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) and Vermeulen and Barkema (2001), 
and (2) Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) measure of religious distance. When we used these alternative 
measures, we obtained results highly similar to the ones reported in Table 4.12 
 
Additional analyses 
Contrary to our expectations, we found that an MNE’s preference for acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries does not increase with the level of autonomy it plans to grant the focal subsidiary. One possible 
explanation is that higher levels of subsidiary autonomy make it more difficult for MNEs to capture the 
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novel practices that come with acquisitions. Since some of these practices are non-location bound, their 
MNE acquirer needs to transfer them from the acquired subsidiary to other parts of its corporate network 
in order to fully exploit their potential. Such intra-firm transfers of practices become more difficult when 
the acquired subsidiary has more autonomy, as they require close ties between source and recipient units 
(Szulanski, 1996; Kostova, 1999). Hence, although MNEs planning to grant the focal subsidiary higher 
levels of autonomy may value the practices that come with acquisitions more, they may at the same time 
realize that it will be more difficult for them to benefit from these practices, causing the likelihood of an 
acquisition in a culturally-distant country not to increase with the planned level of subsidiary autonomy. 
However, higher levels of subsidiary autonomy should not make it more difficult for MNEs to benefit 
from the local market knowledge that comes with acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. The reason 
is that this knowledge is typically location-bound and hence does not need to be transferred to other parts 
of an MNE’s corporate network. Consequently, an MNE does not need to have close ties with an acquired 
subsidiary in order to benefit from the local market knowledge of that subsidiary. In fact, to take 
maximum advantage of this knowledge, the MNE should allow the subsidiary to continue to determine its 
own policies by granting it considerable autonomy (Harzing, 2002). 
Since not all business activities depend to the same extent on local market knowledge, the benefits of 
granting autonomy to an acquired subsidiary are likely to differ across business activities (cf. Prahalad 
and Doz, 1987). Hence, it could be that MNEs planning to grant their subsidiaries autonomy in areas that 
rely heavily on market knowledge are more likely to make acquisitions in culturally-distant countries, 
while those planning to grant their subsidiaries autonomy in areas that rely less on such knowledge are 
not. This may also explain why we found that the average level of subsidiary autonomy across all 
business activities did not increase the probability that MNEs enter culturally-distant countries through 
acquisitions. To examine whether the moderating effect of the level of subsidiary autonomy indeed differs 
across business activities, we performed a principal-components factor analysis on the 11 items 
comprising our composite subsidiary autonomy measure. This analysis yielded three factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 that together explained 67.6% of the total variance. Since the item ‘packaging’ 
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loaded almost equally on all three factors, we removed it and performed another factor analysis on the 10 
remaining items. This produced three clearly interpretable factors together explaining 68.8% of the total 
variance. The first factor consists of the human resource management (HRM) activities ‘design of reward 
systems, ‘job design’, and ‘selection and training of employees’ (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82), while the 
second consists of ‘procurement’, ‘product/service design’, ‘R&D’, and ‘production/service process’, and 
is hence production related (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). The third factor consists of the items ‘use of brand 
names’, ‘pricing’, and ‘advertising and sales promotion’, and is clearly marketing related (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.74). We averaged the scores on the items comprising each factor and examined whether the 
resulting three dimensions of subsidiary autonomy had different moderating effects on the relationship 
between cultural distance and establishment mode choice. Table 5 shows that this was indeed the case. 
MNEs planning to grant the focal subsidiary much autonomy in marketing are more likely to make 
acquisitions in culturally-distant countries (Model 9b), whereas MNEs planning to grant it much 
autonomy in HRM or production are not (Models 7b and 8b). These findings suggest that local market 
knowledge plays a more important role in marketing than in HRM and production activities. We obtained 
the same results when we used our two alternative cultural distance measures. 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Prior research has argued that the costs of managing acquisitions increase faster with cultural distance 
than those of managing greenfields, leading MNEs to enter culturally-distant countries through 
greenfields rather than through acquisitions (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; 
Larimo). However, several empirical studies have not found support for this claim (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers 2000), and we observe quite 
frequently MNEs making acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. In this paper we sought to close this 
gap between theory and empirical reality by identifying the conditions under which MNEs find it more 
attractive to enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions. We argued that the attractiveness of 
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making acquisitions rather than greenfield investments in culturally-distant countries depends on an 
MNE’s international and host-country experience, and on the level of autonomy it grants the focal 
subsidiary. Analyzing 171 wholly-owned greenfield investments and full acquisitions made by Dutch 
MNEs, we found that these MNEs have a higher preference for acquisitions in culturally-distant countries 
when they have little international experience or plan to grant the focal subsidiary considerable autonomy 
in marketing. 
While we found MNEs with little international experience to have a higher propensity to enter 
culturally-distant countries through acquisitions, this was not the case for MNEs with little host-country 
experience. One possible explanation is that an MNE’s host-country experience is a less accurate proxy 
for its need to obtain new practices and market knowledge through acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries than its international experience. Even when MNEs lack experience with a particular culturally-
distant host country, they may find the benefits of making an acquisition in that country to be low, as they 
may have obtained many diverse practices and knowledge of culturally-similar markets through prior 
foreign ventures. 
However, international and host-country experience did both have a direct effect on establishment 
mode choice. In line with prior studies (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2002), we found that, keeping cultural distance constant, MNEs 
with little host-country experience as well as those with little international experience are more likely to 
choose greenfields. When simultaneously considering the direct and indirect effects of international 
experience, we can conclude that MNEs with little international experience generally prefer greenfield 
entry, but that this preference is weaker in culturally-distant countries, presumably because acquisitions in 
such countries enable inexperienced MNEs to extend their relatively small pool of assets with radically-
new practices and knowledge of culturally-distant markets. 
When we broke down an MNE’s international experience into its international experience with 
greenfields and its international experience with acquisitions, we continued to find both direct and 
indirect effects. In line with Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), we found that MNEs with extensive foreign 
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greenfield experience are more likely to choose greenfields, while those with extensive cross-border 
acquisition experience are more likely to make acquisitions. As expected, we also found that both of these 
experience types moderate the relationship between cultural distance and establishment mode choice. We 
found them to moderate this relationship in the same way, with MNEs with extensive greenfield 
experience and those with extensive acquisition experience both being more likely to enter culturally-
distant countries through greenfields. The likely reason is that both of these types of MNEs have little 
need to obtain novel practices and local market knowledge through acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries, as they have already built up a large and diverse pool of practices and market knowledge 
through their many previous international ventures. Hence, our findings suggest that both previous 
acquisitions and previous greenfields contribute to an MNE’s pool of assets. This conclusion runs counter 
to Vermeulen and Barkema (2001)’s claim that MNEs only learn from their previous acquisitions. 
According to them, greenfields do not contribute to an MNE’s knowledge base but are merely used for 
the exploitation of existing knowledge. Our findings suggest a more nuanced view. Wholly-owned 
greenfields indeed do not bring novel practices and local market knowledge, and hence do not 
immediately contribute to an MNE’s knowledge base, leading inexperienced MNEs to make acquisitions 
in culturally-distant countries. However, wholly-owned greenfields do gradually develop valuable 
practices and/or market knowledge over time, thereby eventually enlarging an MNE’s knowledge base. 
Consequently, the larger an MNE’s experience with prior greenfields, the lower its need to make 
acquisitions in culturally-distant countries. 
As with different types of foreign experiences, we also expected the planned level of subsidiary 
autonomy to moderate the relationship between cultural distance and establishment mode choice. We 
found partial support for this expectation, as the intended level of subsidiary autonomy in marketing 
significantly increased the probability that MNEs enter culturally-distant countries through acquisitions, 
but the intended overall level of autonomy did not. As stated earlier, these findings suggest that the 
benefits of granting autonomy to acquisitions in culturally-distant countries are larger for marketing than 
for other business activities. The intended overall level of subsidiary autonomy did have a direct effect on 
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establishment mode choice, however. Keeping cultural distance constant, we found that MNEs planning 
to grant higher overall levels of autonomy to a subsidiary prefer acquisition over greenfield entry. This 
finding is in line with Harzing’s (2002) finding that MNEs with a multidomestic strategy are more likely 
to expand abroad through acquisitions and those with a global strategy through greenfields. 
In order to accurately operationalize our theoretical constructs and to carefully control for other 
factors influencing establishment mode choices, we collected a part of our data through a survey. Except 
for the subsidiary’s establishment mode and the parent’s host-country experience, our survey-based 
variables are measured through perceptual Likert-type scales (see Appendix A). A limitation of such 
perceptual measures is that the items and response categories used may be interpreted differently by 
different managers, even when these managers have the same nationality. Some of our findings should 
therefore be interpreted with care. Another limitation of our study is that we only analyzed the foreign 
investments of Dutch MNEs. We therefore invite researchers to examine the generalizability of our 
findings by replicating our tests on samples of foreign investments made by non-Dutch MNEs. We also 
encourage future studies to explore the existence of other interaction effects besides those identified in 
this paper. Except for Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), establishment mode scholars have limited 
themselves to examining the main effects of specific factors and have overlooked that these factors may 
jointly affect MNEs’ establishment mode choices. This study has been a first attempt to systematically 
identify some of these joint effects. 
Since MNEs may not only obtain new practices through acquisitions but also through greenfield 
JVs, future studies could also examine whether it is more attractive for MNEs to learn these practices 
through full acquisitions of local firms or through greenfield JVs with such firms. Since JVs are often 
more temporary forms of cooperation, local firms joint venturing with MNEs run a higher risk of creating 
a new competitor by sharing their valuable practices with MNEs than those being acquired by MNEs. 
Consequently, local JV partners may be more reluctant to share their practices with MNEs than acquired 
local firms. Moreover, JVs may be costlier to manage than acquisitions because they involve a local 
partner with an equity stake and, hence, decision-making power. On the other hand, by fully acquiring 
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this equity stake, MNEs take away one of the incentives of the acquired firm’s management to perform 
well, thereby increasing management costs (Hennart, 1988). Future research may shed more light on the 
comparative benefits and management costs of JVs and acquisitions.  
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Notes 
1In our sample 35.4% of all investments in culturally-distant countries (i.e., countries with a cultural 
distance score above the sample median) are acquisitions. These acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries comprise 44.3% of all acquisitions in our sample. 
2All firms registered in the Netherlands are legally required to file data with the Chamber of 
Commerce. 
3Most of these firms were MNE parents. However, a few parents allowed their Dutch-based 
divisions to independently make foreign investments. We therefore also sent the questionnaire to the 
directors of these divisions. 
4Although some respondents worked for the same firm, they usually provided data on different 
investments. In the very few cases where they did provide data on the same investment, we followed Very 
et al. (1997) and averaged their responses into a single observation. 
5It should be noted that we were unable to obtain sales and employee data for some of the MNEs to 
which we sent the questionnaire. 
6We think there are two reasons why the responding MNEs were on average larger than the non-
responders. First, large MNEs are more likely to have established or acquired foreign subsidiaries in 
recent years, and are therefore more likely to qualify for participation in the study, as we explicitly asked 
for data on recent foreign investments. Second, because large MNEs, on average, invest abroad more 
often, their management is likely to be more interested in participating in our study, as we gave 
respondents the option to receive a free overview of its main findings. 
7When we assigned equal weights to all experience types, we obtained results similar to those 
reported in Table 4, although the main effect of the unweighted host-country experience measure was 
somewhat weaker than that of the weighted one. 
8These low correlations are caused by the fact that subsidiaries generally had very little autonomy 
with respect to raising capital. In 148 of the 171 cases respondents assigned a score of 1 to this item. 
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9We did not always have autonomy scores on all items, either because the desired level of autonomy 
for particular activities had not been decided ex ante, or because subsidiaries did not perform certain 
activities. We therefore averaged the scores of those items for which scores were available. 
10The BIK-code is the Dutch equivalent of the American SIC-code. It has been developed by the 
Dutch Chamber of Commerce. 
11The chance rate is calculated as a2 + (1 – a)2, where a is the proportion of greenfields in the 
sample. 
12These results are available from the authors upon request.
  29 
 
References 
Amemiya, T. (1981) ‘Qualitative response models: A survey’, Journal of Economic Literature 19(4): 
1483-1536. 
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P.J. (1993) ‘Strategic assets and organizational rent’, Strategic Management 
Journal 14(1): 33-46. 
Anand, J. and Delios, A. (1996) ‘Competing globally: How Japanese MNCs have matched goals and 
strategies in India and China’, Columbia Journal of World Business 31(3): 50-62. 
Anand, J. and Delios, A. (2002) ‘Absolute and relative resources as determinants of international 
acquisitions’, Strategic Management Journal 23(2): 119-134. 
Andersson, T. and Svensson, R. (1994) ‘Entry modes for direct investment determined by the 
composition of firm-specific skills’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96(4): 551-560. 
Barkema, H.G., Bell, J.H.J. and Pennings, J.M. (1996) ‘Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning’, 
Strategic Management Journal 17(2): 151-166. 
Barkema, H.G. and Vermeulen, F. (1998) ‘International expansion through start-up or acquisition: A 
learning perspective’, Academy of Management Journal 41(1): 7-26. 
Bartlett, C.A. and Ghoshal, S. (1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Harvard 
Business School Press: Boston. 
Belsley, D.A., Kuh, E. and Welsch, R.E. (1980) Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and 
Sources of Collinearity, Wiley: New York. 
Brouthers, K.D. and Brouthers, L.E. (2000) ‘Acquisition or greenfield start-up? Institutional, cultural and 
transaction cost influences’, Strategic Management Journal 21(1): 89-97. 
Caves, R.E. 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, second edition, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, NY. 
Caves, R.E. and Mehra, S.K. (1986) ‘Entry of foreign multinationals into U.S. manufacturing industries’, 
in M.E. Porter (ed.) Competition in Global Industries, Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA, 
pp. 449-481. 
  30 
 
Chang, S.-J. and Rosenzweig, P.M. (2001) ‘The choice of entry mode in sequential foreign direct 
investment’, Strategic Management Journal 22(8): 747-776. 
Child, J., Falkner, D. and Pitkethly, R. (2001) The Management of International Acquisitions, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, UK. 
Cho, K.R. and Padmanabhan, P. (1995) ‘Acquisition versus new venture: The choice of foreign 
establishment mode by Japanese firms’, Journal of International Management 1(3): 255-285. 
Datta, D.K. (1991) ‘Organizational fit and acquisition performance: Effects of post-acquisition 
integration’, Strategic Management Journal 12(4): 281-297. 
Datta, D.K., Herrmann, P. and Rasheed, A.A. (2002) ‘Choice of foreign market entry mode: Critical 
review and future directions’, in M.A. Hitt and J.L.C. Cheng (Eds.) Managing transnational firms: 
Resources, market entry and strategic alliances. Advances in International Management 14, JAI 
Press: Amsterdam, pp. 85-153. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W.J. (2000) ‘Japanese firms’ investment strategies in emerging economies’, 
Academy of Management Journal 43(3): 305-323. 
Dow, D. and Karunaratna, A. (2006) ‘Developing a multidimensional instrument to measure psychic 
distance stimuli’, Journal of International Business Studies 37(6): 578-602. 
Hair Jr., J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L. and Black, W.C. (1998) Multivariate Data Analysis, fifth 
edition, Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Harman, H.H. (1967) Modern Factor Analysis, University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Harzing, A.-W. (2000) ‘An empirical analysis and extension of the Bartlett and Ghoshal typology of 
multinational companies’, Journal of International Business Studies 31(1): 101-120. 
Harzing, A.-W. (2002) ‘Acquisitions versus greenfield investments: International strategy and 
management of entry modes’, Strategic Management Journal 23(3): 211-227. 
Hennart, J.-F. (1982) A Theory of Multinational Enterprise, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. 
Hennart, J.-F. (1988) ‘A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures’, Strategic Management Journal 
9(4): 361-374. 
  31 
 
Hennart, J.-F. and Park, Y.-R. (1993) ‘Greenfield vs. acquisition: The strategy of Japanese investors in the 
United States’, Management Science 39(9): 1054-1070. 
Henisz, W.J. (2000) ‘The institutional environment for multinational investment’, Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 16(2): 334-364. 
Hofstede, G. (1980) Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, Sage 
Publications: Beverly Hills, CA. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and 
Organizations across Nations, second edition, Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.-E. (1977) ‘The internationalization process of the firm – A model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments’, Journal of International 
Business Studies 8(1): 23-32. 
Kim, W.C. and Hwang, P. (1992) ‘Global strategy and multinationals’ entry mode choice’, Journal of 
International Business Studies 23(1): 29-53. 
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988) ‘The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode’, Journal of 
International Business Studies 19(3): 411-432. 
Kostova, T. (1999) ‘Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual perspective’, 
Academy of Management Review 24(2): 308-324. 
Kotabe, M., Martin, X. and Domoto. H. (2003) ‘Gaining from vertical partnerships: Knowledge transfer, 
relationship duration, and supplier performance in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries’, 
Strategic Management Journal 24(4): 293-316. 
Larimo, J. (2003) ‘Form of investment by Nordic firms in world markets’, Journal of Business Research 
56(10): 791-803. 
Morosini, P., Shane, S. and Singh, H. (1998) ‘National cultural distance and cross-border acquisition 
performance’, Journal of International Business Studies 29(1): 137-158. 
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Bellknap/Harvard: 
Cambridge, MA. 
  32 
 
Padmanabhan, P. and Cho, K.R. (1999) ‘Decision-specific experience in foreign ownership and 
establishment strategies: Evidence from Japanese firms’, Journal of International Business Studies 
30(1): 25-44. 
Perlmutter, H. (1969) ‘The tortuous evolution of the multinational corporation’, Columbia Journal of 
World Business 4(January-February): 9-18. 
Prahalad, C.K. and Doz, Y.L. (1987) The Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global 
Vision, Free Press: New York. 
Rugman, A.M. and Verbeke, A. (1992) ‘A note on the transnational solution and the transaction cost 
theory of multinational strategic management’, Journal of International Business Studies 23(4): 
761-771. 
Shenkar, O. (2001) ‘Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous conceptualization and 
measurement of cultural differences’, Journal of International Business Studies 32(3): 519-535. 
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M.A., Vaidyanath, D. and Pisano, V. (2004) ‘Theoretical foundations of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions: A review of current research and recommendations for the future’, 
Journal of International Management 10(3): 307-353. 
Sφndergaard, M. (1994) ‘Hofstede’s consequences: A study of reviews, citations, and replications’, 
Organization Studies 15(3): 447-456. 
Szulanski, G. (1996) ‘Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best practice within the 
firm’, Strategic Management Journal 17(Winter special issue): 27-43. 
Tan, D. and Mahoney, J.T. (2003) ‘Explaining the utilization of managerial expatriates from the 
perspectives of resource-based, agency, and transaction cost theories’, in J.L.C. Cheng and M.A. 
Hitt (eds.) Advances in international management 15, Elsevier JAI: Amsterdam, pp. 179-205. 
UNCTAD. (2000) World Investment Report 2000: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Development Overview, New York: United Nations. 
Van Oudenhoven, J.P. (2001) ‘Do organizations reflect national cultures? A 10-nation study’, Internal 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 25(1): 89-107. 
  33 
 
Vermeulen, F., and Barkema, H.G. (2001) ‘Learning through acquisitions’, Academy of Management 
Journal 44(3): 457-476. 
Very, P., Lubatkin, M., Calori, R. and Veiga, J. (1997) ‘Relative standing and the performance of recently 
acquired European firms’, Strategic Management Journal 18(8): 593-614. 
Weber, Y., Shenkar, O. and Raveh, A. (1996) ‘National and corporate cultural fit in mergers/acquisitions: 
An exploratory study’, Management Science 42(8): 1215-1227. 
Wilson, B.D. (1980) ‘The propensity of multinational companies to expand through acquisitions’, Journal 
of International Business Studies 11(Spring-Summer): 59-65. 
Xu, D., Pan, Y. and P.W. Beamish (2004) ‘The effect of regulative and normative distances on MNE 
ownership and expatriate strategies’, Management International Review 44(3): 285-307. 
Zejan, M.C. (1990) ‘New ventures or acquisitions: The choice of Swedish multinational enterprises’, 
Journal of Industrial Economics 38(3): 349-355. 
  34 
 
Appendix A 
 
Selected questionnaire items 
 
MNE’s international greenfield experience: How much experience with setting up new foreign 
subsidiaries (i.e., foreign greenfield investments) does your entity have? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘none’ to ‘very much’) 
 
MNE’s international acquisition experience: How much experience with acquiring foreign firms 
does your entity have? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘none’ to ‘very much’) 
 
MNE’s host-country experience: In which way(s) has your entity been active in country X before 
greenfield A [venture B] was established [acquired]? Please tick all forms of involvement that apply. 
___ by means of licensing agreements 
___ by means of one ore more sales agents 
___ by means of one or more sales subsidiaries 
___ by means of one or more manufacturing or service subsidiaries 
___ otherwise, viz. ______________________________________ 
 
Subsidiary autonomy: The degree of subsidiary autonomy is the extent to which a subsidiary’s 
management team is free to run the venture at its own discretion. How much autonomy did your 
management team intend to give greenfield A [venture B] at the time it was established [acquired]? Please 
answer this question for each of the following functions that apply: 
• procurement 
• product/service design 
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• R & D 
• production/service process 
• the use of brand names 
• packaging 
• pricing 
• advertising and sales promotion 
• the design of reward systems 
• job design 
• selection and training of employees 
• raising capital 
(5-point Likert-type scales ranging from ‘very little autonomy intended’ to ‘very much autonomy 
intended’. For each item we also provided a separate category ‘no intentions in advance’.) 
 
Amount of technological knowledge transferred: How much proprietary technological knowledge 
did your entity intend to transfer to greenfield A [venture B] at the time of the decision to establish 
[acquire] the venture? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘none’ to ‘very much’) 
 
Investment size: What was the [planned] relative size (in terms of the number of employees) of 
venture B [greenfield A] compared to the size of your entity at the time of the acquisition [at the time 
greenfield A was established]? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘very small’ to ‘very large’)  
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Demand growth: At the time of the decision to establish greenfield A [acquire venture B], how large 
did your management team expect the growth rate of the demand for greenfield A’s [venture B’s] 
products/services would be? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly negative’ to ‘strongly positive’) 
 
Lack of acquisition targets: 
For greenfields: To what extent was the decision to undertake a greenfield investment in country X 
influenced by a lack of suitable acquisition candidates in country X? 
For acquisitions: To what extent was your entity confronted with a lack of suitable acquisition 
candidates in country X? 
(7-point Likert-type scales ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘to a very large extent’) 
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Table 1 Geographic distribution of the foreign investments in the sample 
 
Region Number of investments Percentage 
Belgium and Luxembourg 21 12.3 
Northern Europe 11 6.4 
United Kingdom and Ireland 25 14.6 
Southern Europe 20 11.7 
Germanic countries 19 11.1 
Eastern Europe 24 14.0 
North America 23 13.5 
Latin America 10 5.8 
Asia 12 7.0 
Australia 3 1.8 
Africa 3 1.8 
 
 
Table 2 Industry distribution of the MNEs in the sample 
 
Main industry Number of MNEs Percentage 
Agriculture and horticulture 3 2.5 
Food and beverages 10 8.3 
Machinery and electronics 11 9.2 
Wood and paper products 9 7.5 
Chemicals and synthetics 14 11.7 
Metal products 11 9.2 
Construction 5 4.2 
Other manufacturing 4 3.3 
Retail and wholesale trade 13 10.8 
Transportation, storage, and 
communication 8 6.7 
Financial services 13 10.8 
Professional services 17 14.2 
Other services 2 1.7 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlations (N=171)a 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Establishment mode 0.54 0.50               
2. Cultural distance 2.07 0.96 .33              
3. MNE’s international experienceb 2.66 1.26 -.20 .00             
4. MNE’s international greenfield experience 5.01 1.66 .17 .09 .30            
5. MNE’s international acquisition experience 4.96 1.85 -.30 -.07 .65 .22           
6. MNE’s host-country experience 3.10 2.38 -.26 .05 .19 -.03 .18          
7. Subsidiary autonomy 3.10 0.87 -.22 -.21 .01 -.14 .07 .03         
8. MNE’s level of diversificationb 0.87 0.63 -.20 -.16 .28 -.10 .22 .16 .14        
9. MNE typec 0.50 0.50 .04 -.06 .07 -.03 .08 -.04 .04 -.00       
10. Amount of technology to be transferred 4.06 2.06 .20 .04 -.12 .00 -.06 -.05 .03 -.10 -.07      
11. Unrelated investment 0.19 0.45 -.12 -.14 .15 -.00 .16 .09 .25 .20 .17 -.04     
12. Investment size 2.51 1.59 -.25 -.10 -.13 -.10 -.06 .04 .14 -.11 -.15 .21 .03    
13. Deviation from average demand growth 0.82 0.53 -.10 .11 .06 .13 .07 -.03 -.06 -.16 .04 -.01 -.10 -.08   
14. Acquisition restrictions 1.83 1.09 .26 .48 .08 .14 -.04 .07 -.11 -.12 -.15 .02 .00 -.08 .10  
15. Lack of acquisition targets 2.78 1.99 .25 .05 -.04 .03 .13 -.13 .01 -.17 .02 .03 -.05 -.02 -.02 .09 
 
a
 Correlations greater than or equal to |0.15| are significant at P<0.05, while those greater than or equal to |0.20| are significant at P<0.01 (two-tailed). 
b
 Logged to eliminate skewness and/or outliers. 
c
 Non-manufacturing = 1. 
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Table 4 Logistic regression estimates of the probability of greenfield entry (N=171)a 
 
Variable Model 1  Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 3a  Model 3b  Model 4a  Model 4b  
Cultural distance 0.76
(0.32)
** 0.69
(0.33)
* -1.98
(0.84)
** .78
(0.32)
** -3.61
(1.43)
** 0.75
(0.40)
* -0.80
(0.62)
† 
MNE’s international 
experience 
 -0.39
(0.20)
* -2.68
(0.78)
***     
Cultural distance x MNE’s 
international experience 
  1.15
(0.36)
***     
MNE’s greenfield experience    0.21
(0.12)
* -1.48
(0.56)
**   
Cultural distance x MNE’s 
greenfield experience 
    0.92
(0.30)
**   
MNE’s acquisition experience      -0.61
(0.14)
*** -1.24
(0.30)
*** 
Cultural distance x MNE’s 
acquisition experience 
      0.32
(0.13)
* 
MNE’s level of diversification -0.71
(0.33)
* -0.73
(0.33)
* -0.70
(0.35)
* -0.63
(0.37)
* -0.59
(0.38)
† -0.62
(0.35)
* -0.63
(0.36)
* 
MNE typeb 0.35
(0.43)
 0.41
(0.42)
 0.53
(0.47)
 0.37
(0.45)
 0.69
(0.52)
† 0.54
(0.43)
 0.55
(0.44)
 
Amount of technology to be 
transferred 
0.31
(0.11)
** 0.30
(0.10)
** 0.32
(0.12)
** 0.33
(0.11)
** 0.31
(0.11)
** 0.33
(0.10)
*** 0.34
(0.11)
*** 
Unrelated investment -0.29
(0.41)
 -0.22
(0.45)
 -0.39
(0.51)
 -0.38
(0.43)
 -0.51
(0.46)
 -0.01
(0.48)
 -0.07
(0.52)
 
Investment size -0.64
(0.17)
*** -0.66
(0.17)
*** -0.70
(0.19)
*** -0.63
(0.18)
*** -0.61
(0.20)
*** -0.81
(0.20)
*** -0.81
(0.20)
*** 
Deviation from average 
demand growth 
-1.00
(0.46)
* -0.96
(0.46)
* -1.16
(0.47)
** -1.05
(0.46)
* -1.03
(0.47)
* -1.03
(0.45)
* -1.16
(0.47)
** 
Acquisition restrictions 0.45
(0.25)
* 0.57
(0.30)
* 0.81
(0.30)
** 0.42
(0.26)
† 0.43
(0.33)
† 0.50
(0.27)
* 0.53
(0.32)
* 
Lack of acquisition targets 0.26
(0.12)
* 0.27
(0.12)
* 0.28
(0.12)
* 0.25
(0.12)
* 0.22
(0.13)
* 0.37
(0.13)
** 0.35
(0.14)
** 
        
χ2 56.08*** 48.73*** 39.88** 71.12*** 63.23*** 45.79*** 50.01*** 
Log likelihood -77.97 -76.30 -70.62 -76.59 -71.94 -68.54 -66.59 
Likelihood ratio test of:        
- focal model vs. Model 1  3.33†  2.76†  18.86***  
- interaction term   11.37***  9.31**  3.89* 
Pseudo R2 0.339 0.354 0.402 0.351 0.391 0.419 0.436 
 
a
 Greenfield = 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and intercept are suppressed. 
b
 Non-manufacturing = 1. 
† P<0.1, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001 (two-tailed tests for competing hypotheses, one-tailed tests otherwise). 
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Table 4 (continued) Logistic regression estimates of the probability of greenfield entry (N=171)a 
 
Variable Model 5a  Model 5b  Model 6a  Model 6b  
Cultural distance 0.87
(0.39)
* 1.25
(0.67)
* 0.72
(0.34)
* 0.54
(1.03)
 
MNE’s host-country experience -0.27
(0.10)
** -0.06
(0.23)
   
Cultural distance x MNE’s host-country experience  -0.11
(0.12)
   
Subsidiary autonomy   -0.40
(0.22)
* -0.52
(0.82)
 
Cultural distance x Subsidiary autonomy    0.06
(0.40)
 
MNE’s level of diversification -0.60
(0.34)
* -0.61
(0.34)
* -0.67
(0.34)
* -0.67
(0.34)
* 
MNE typeb 0.37
(0.45)
 0.37
(0.45)
 0.36
(0.42)
 0.37
(0.42)
 
Amount of technology to be transferred 0.33
(0.12)
** 0.33
(0.12)
** 0.30
(0.11)
** 0.30
(0.11)
** 
Unrelated investment -0.31
(0.39)
 -0.37
(0.40)
 -0.07
(0.41)
 -0.06
(0.41)
 
Investment size -0.65
(0.18)
*** -0.67
(0.18)
*** -0.59
(0.18)
*** -0.60
(0.18)
*** 
Deviation from average demand growth -1.10
(0.49)
* -1.17
(0.50)
** -0.96
(0.46)
* -0.95
(0.46)
* 
Acquisition restrictions  0.56
(0.24)
** 0.62
(0.24)
** 0.43
(0.25)
* 0.43
(0.27)
† 
Lack of acquisition targets 0.27
(0.12)
* 0.27
(0.12)
* 0.27
(0.12)
* 0.27
(0.12)
* 
     
χ2 70.22*** 64.31*** 58.49*** 63.94*** 
Log likelihood -74.07 -73.73 -76.60 -76.59 
Likelihood ratio test of focal model vs. Model 1 7.79**  2.73†  
Likelihood ratio test of interaction term  0.69  0.03 
Pseudo R2 0.372 0.375 0.351 0.351 
 
a
 Greenfield = 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and intercept are suppressed. 
b
 Non-manufacturing = 1. 
† P<0.1, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001 (two-tailed tests for competing hypotheses, one-tailed tests otherwise). 
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Table 5 Additional logistic regression estimates of the probability of greenfield entrya 
 
Variable Model 7a  Model 7b  Model 8a  Model 8b  Model 9a  Model 9b  
Cultural distance 0.76
(0.31)
** 0.80
(0.33)
** 1.26
(0.46)
** 1.54
(0.60)
** 0.69
(0.35)
* 0.75
(0.33)
* 
Subsidiary autonomy in HRM 0.08
(0.16)
 0.10
(0.16)
     
Cultural distance x Subsidiary 
autonomy in HRM 
 0.13
(0.27)
     
Subsidiary autonomy in 
production 
  -0.95
(0.32)
** -0.85
(0.31)
**   
Cultural distance x Subsidiary 
autonomy in production 
   0.49
(0.46)
   
Subsidiary autonomy in 
marketing 
    -0.36
(0.25)
† -0.60
(0.24)
** 
Cultural distance x Subsidiary 
autonomy in marketing 
     -0.67
(0.37)
* 
MNE’s level of diversification -0.70
(0.35)
* -0.72
(0.35)
* -0.67
(0.41)
* -0.78
(0.44)
* -0.97
(0.41)
** -1.01
(0.44)
* 
MNE typeb 0.34
(0.43)
 0.35
(0.43)
 2.10
(0.79)
** 2.04
(0.76)
** 0.38
(0.44)
 0.36
(0.46)
 
Amount of technology to be 
transferred 
0.31
(0.11)
** 0.31
(0.11)
** 0.55
(0.13)
*** 0.56
(0.14)
*** 0.27
(0.11)
** 0.30
(0.12)
** 
Unrelated investment -0.40
(0.44)
 -0.39
(0.45)
 0.64
(0.67)
 0.70
(0.71)
 -0.22
(0.42)
 -0.24
(0.43)
 
Investment size -0.63
(0.17)
*** -0.65
(0.17)
*** -0.41
(0.18)
* -0.44
(0.18)
** -0.92
(0.25)
*** -0.96
(0.25)
*** 
Deviation from average 
demand growth 
-1.04
(0.48)
* -1.05
(0.48)
* -0.82
(0.52)
† -0.80
(0.51)
† -1.74
(0.53)
*** -1.96
(0.58)
*** 
Acquisition restrictions 0.47
(0.25)
* 0.48
(0.26)
* 0.44
(0.33)
† 0.38
(0.31)
 0.60
(0.28)
* 0.54
(0.30)
* 
Lack of acquisition targets 0.25
(0.12)
* 0.25
(0.12)
* 0.30
(0.18)
* 0.28
(0.18)
† 0.33
(0.15)
* 0.38
(0.16)
** 
       
N 169 169 133 133 149 149 
χ2 54.42*** 54.40*** 52.54*** 51.77*** 48.69*** 58.06*** 
Log likelihood -77.36 -74.48 -45.72 -45.29 -58.39 -57.13 
Pseudo R2 0.338 0.338 0.504 0.508 0.433 0.445 
 
a
 Greenfield = 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and intercept are suppressed. 
b
 Non-manufacturing = 1. 
† P<0.1, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001 (one-tailed tests). 
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2007 
 
Leadership Behaviour and Upward Feedback: Findings From a Longitudinal Intervention 
Dirk van Dierendonck, Clare Haynes, Carol Borrill and Chris Stride 
ERS-2007-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8579
 
The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutionalizing New Power Relations 
Bettina B.F. Wittneben 
ERS-2007-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8582
 
How Today’s Consumers Perceive Tomorrow’s Smart Products 
Serge A. Rijsdijk and Erik Jan Hultink 
ERS-2007-005-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8984
 
Product Intelligence: Its Conceptualization, Measurement and Impact on Consumer Satisfaction 
Serge A. Rijsdijk, Erik Jan Hultink and Adamantios Diamantopoulos 
ERS-2007-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8580
 
Testing the Strength of the Iron Cage: A Meta-Analysis of Neo-Institutional Theory 
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Michel Lander 
ERS-2007-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8581
 
Export Orientation among New Ventures and Economic Growth 
S. Jolanda A. Hessels and André van Stel 
ERS-2007-008-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8583
 
Allocation and Productivity of Time in New Ventures of Female and Male Entrepreneurs 
Ingrid Verheul, Martin Carree and Roy Thurik 
ERS-2007-009-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8989
 
Cooperating if one’s Goals are Collective-Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal-Transformation 
David De Cremer, Daan van Knippenberg, Eric van Dijk and Esther van Leeuwen 
ERS-2007-010-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9041
 
Unfit to Learn? How Long View Organizations Adapt to Environmental Jolts 
Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens and Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos 
ERS-2007-014-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9404
 
Going, Going, Gone. Innovation and Exit in Manufacturing Firms 
Elena Cefis and Orietta Marsili 
ERS-2007-015-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9732
 
 
 
 
High in the Hierarchy: How Vertical Location and Judgments of Leaders' Power are Interrelated 
Steffen R. Giessner and Thomas W. Schubert 
ERS-2007-021-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9727
 
Contracts to Communities: a Processual Model of Organizational Virtue 
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, Muel Kaptein and J. van Oosterhout 
ERS-2007-023-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9728
 
Why Are Some Entrepreneurs More Innovative Than Others? 
Philipp Koellinger 
ERS-2007-024-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9730
 
Stimulating Strategically Aligned Behaviour Among Employees 
Cees B. M. van Riel, Guido Berens and Majorie Dijkstra 
ERS-2007-029-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10067  
 
The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated 
Research Model 
Muel Kaptein and Mark Schwartz 
ERS-2007-030-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10150  
 
Knowledge Spillovers and Entrepreneurs’ Export Orientation 
Dirk De Clercq, Jolanda Hessels and André van Stel 
ERS-2007-038-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10178  
 
Silicon Valley in the Polder? Entrepreneurial Dynamics, Virtuous Clusters and Vicious Firms in the Netherlands and Flanders 
Willem Hulsink, Harry Bouwman and Tom Elfring 
ERS-2007-048-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10459  
 
An Incomplete Contracting Model of Governance Structure Variety in Franchising 
George Hendrikse and Tao Jiang 
ERS-2007-049-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10462  
 
On the Evolution of Product Portfolio Coherence of Cooperatives versus Corporations: An Agent-Based Analysis of the 
Single Origin Constraint 
George Hendrikse and Ruud Smit 
ERS-2007-055-ORG 
 
 
Greenfield or Acquisition Entry: A Review of the Empirical Foreign Establishment Mode Literature 
Arjen H.L. Slangen and Jean-François Hennart 
ERS-2007-059-ORG 
 
 
Do Multinationals Really Prefer to Enter Culturally-Distant Countries Through Greenfields Rather than Through Acquisitions? 
The Role of Parent Experience and Subsidiary Autonomy 
Arjen H.L. Slangen and Jean-François Hennart 
ERS-2007-060-ORG 
 
 
 
 
 
The Financial Centres of Shanghai and Hong Kong: Competition or Complementarity? 
Bas Karreman and Bert van der Knaap 
ERS-2007-062-ORG 
 
 
Peer Influence in Network Markets: An Empirical Investigation 
Jörn H. Block and Philipp Köllinger 
ERS-2007-063-ORG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
